Recent capital market research evidence suggests that a large proportion of public companies worldwide are characterized by controlling stockholders who are more often families, usually the founder(s) or their descendants. There has been considerable debate on whether 'family' firms can indeed be properly delineated from 'non-family' firms given the diversity and abundance of 'family business' definitions in the literature. The primary objective of this paper is to provide a robust definition of family business for the purposes of capital market research. Using an accounting-based definition of family business, more than 17% percent of listed companies on the Australian bourse have been identified as family controlled. The paper outlines a four-step procedure that provides validation for identifying family controlled companies listed on the Australian Stock Exchange. By combining common themes with authoritative definitions and explanations in accounting standards and legislation, an operational definition of family business is derived. This outcome adds a new dimension to the family business, accounting and finance literatures and has the potential to contribute significantly to future research in these fields.
INTRODUCTION
This paper is part of a larger study which empirically examines the initial price performance and long-term aftermarket operating performance of family and non-family controlled IPO companies that listed on the Australian Stock Exchange between the periods 1 January 1988 and 30 December 1999. Given the paucity of Australian studies on initial and long-term performance of IPOs, and the increasing recognition of the significance of family businesses in modern economies, this study provides an important contribution to the understanding of family controlled enterprises.
In studies involving comparisons of family and non-family firms, the ability to delineate and differentiate the two is paramount since the research outcomes will, by design, be interpreted in the context of dichotomous groupings -family and non-family firms. This study therefore recognises the importance of developing a robust operational and reliable definition of family business. Accordingly, an objective of this paper is to outline a definition of family business sufficiently robust for capital market research purposes.
Family firms enjoy an alignment between ownership and control, and the dynamics of this alignment reduces agency costs which impacts favourably on firm performance (Schillaci & Faraci 1999 , Fama 1998 , McConaughy, 1994 , Jensen & Meckling, 1976 .
But family businesses are difficult to define given the diversity of definitions in the literature which, no doubt, has a direct impact on the validity of studies attempting to measure alignment and resultant agency costs. The literature demonstrates the problematic nature of the term 'family business' with most definitions constructed to suit the specific needs of the researcher (Wortman, 1994) . While generally there is consensus that a family business is one in which family members have substantial ownership interest and exercise control of the operating and financing decisions of the enterprise, Shanker and Astrachan (1996) highlight the need to reach consensus on the definition of family business.
Given these problems of definitional diversity, this paper examines definitions of family business in the literature and identifies the difficulties in using 'ownership' as a criterion for establishing the existence of family firms. Analogous problems encountered by accountants in using the 'ownership' criterion to establish the relationship between a parent company and the companies in which it has an ownership interest (eg. for determining whether or not a company should be consolidated), are also considered. In addition, this paper explores the manner in which accounting practitioners currently apply the 'control' criterion in establishing the existence of a parent/subsidiary relationship, and indeed, the usefulness of adopting this criterion for establishing the existence of a family business. This paper begins with a review of the family business literature, particularly focusing on definitional issues followed by an examination of agency theory and the development of a theoretical framework for a definition of family business. Having established the theoretical reasoning, procedures for development of the operational definition are also described. The paper closes with a detailed description of the operational definition as well as implications and recommendations for further research.
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
The review of the literature relevant to this study identifies a number of opportunities for new research, particularly in respect to the definition of family business and the initial and long-term aftermarket performance of IPOs in the context of family business. An increasing interest in the family business literature has focused on the role of the family business in international economies, and in many instances, evidence suggests that these firms are emerging as substantial contributors to the Gross Domestic Product (Connolly & Jay, 1996; Sharma, Chrisman & Chua, 1996; Smyrnios, Romano & Tanewski 1997; Shanker & Atrachan, 1996; Schillaci & Faraci, 1999) . More recently, however, this evidence has been the subject of debate, primarily because the lack of an appropriate definition of family business results in failure to properly delineate these enterprises from non-family firms. Thus, the actual contributions made by family businesses are not clearly separated from those of other businesses. It is further argued that many of the sources of statistics quoted in the family business literature are not sourced empirically (Shanker & Astrachan, 1996) . Not surprising given the previous literature, a large number of diverse definitions of "family business" exist. Sharma et al. (1996) report no less than thirty four different definitions, of which twenty make reference to an element of ownership interest as a factor which determines the existence of a family enterprise. Moreover, nine definitions make some reference to influence and/or control as determining factors; however the authors argue that these studies do not adequately articulate the meaning of their criteria in an operational context.
To appreciate the magnitude of the definitional problems confronting family business researchers, Shanker and Astrachan (1996) examine the potential outcomes of applying a range of different definitions. They argue that "based on these definitions, the number of family firms in the US can range from 4.1 million to 20.3 million firms, employ 19.8 million to 77.2 million individuals, and provide 12% to 49% of the GDP of the US" (Shanker & Astrachan, 1996, p.4) . These statistics serve to illustrate that a generally accepted definition of family business is an essential and much needed element of empirical research in this area.
A number of authors attempt to define a family business using dimensional or structured approaches. Our review of the literature has identified essentially three dimensions in which many of the different definitions of family business can be classified. These three dimensions are briefly outlined:
1. Degree of ownership and management by family members. The substance of this dimension requires that family members have a minimum level of ownership and be involved in management of the business. A predominant focus on ownership as a key attribute is not unreasonable to expect, given that the literature has identified ownership as a critical variable and an essential part of the production function of the firm (see Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Gallo & Vilaseca, 1998) . Major contributors to the definition of a family business within the ownership and management dimension, include Barnes and Hershon (1976) , Lansberg, Perrow and Rogolsky (1988) and Litz (1995) among many others.
The specific contributions by both Barnes and Hershon (1976) and Lansberg et al (1988) are worth noting because of their direct relevance to the current study. In a brief editorial comment on the growing importance of family businesses and family business research in the US, Lansberg et al (1988) , identify a commonly used definition of family businesses i.e., those firms "in which the members of a family have a legal control over ownership" (p.2). However their comments relating to the reasons for the sparse research on family business are perhaps even more noteworthy. They argue for instance that "much of the confusion about the extent of family control derives from the fact that mechanisms used by families to exert their influence over management (voting, trusts, foundations, holding companies) are deliberately designed to keep the identities of shareholders hidden" (p.3). This point is particularly relevant here because it identifies inter alia the hazardous problem of using ownership as a sole criterion for defining a family business. Further, as will be outlined below, this problem led to the development of a concept of 'control' in AASB1024 -Consolidated Financial Statements, a specific accounting standard in Australia which was designed to identify controlling interests in firms. Moreover, this research primarily relies on the meaning of 'control' in defining a family firm. Barnes and Hershon (1976) examined the often difficult and detrimental process of transferring power from one generation to another in the typical family business. In their study, the family business is generally defined as a firm in which the controlling interest is owned by an individual or by members of a single family. The authors further argued that this definition alters as the business makes the transition from a family-based management to a professionally-based (outsiders) management. A key aspect within their study is the recognition that dominant individuals are at play in the power transference process, and have significant influence in final outcomes (see also Chua et al. (1999) , and their reference to 'dominant coalition ', p. 24) . Indeed without the existence of dominant individuals influencing the dynamics of the family business, the chances of some family businesses surviving are significantly diminished. Chua et al. (1999) argue, for instance, that the essence of a family business is a vision developed by a dominant coalition which shapes and pursues the vision in a way that it is "potentially sustainable across generations of the family" (p. 25). It is also interesting to note that the appearance of dominance by specific individuals is regarded as an important factor associated with firm value. For instance, McConaughy (1994) observed that the identity of the owner-manager is more important than the level of ownership (p. 5). Indeed, Berglof and von Thadden (1999) suggest that most firms (even listed) in the world have a dominating owner and in most cases a family or the state holds such a dominant stake.
Several of these views are consistent with evidence provided by 27 accounting practitioners randomly selected to partake in an interview for the purposes of this study (see Appendix 1). It is observed that most businesses owned by a family or a group of families, have at least one dominant individual steering the course of the business. The participation of a dominant individual in the family business is an important aspect of the current study, since the definition of family business is based on 'control', which in turn is defined as the 'capacity to dominate decision making' It is also worth noting that the importance of dominance in respect to the performance and success of firms is acknowledged in the literature. Neun and Santerre (1986) for example, find that the existence of dominant shareholders increases the value of the firm. They observed that the profitability of the firm increases as the number of shares held by the dominant shareholders increase. They also provided a scale of ownership concentration, which demonstrates the minimum and maximum levels of ownership required to influence managerial decisions. Zeckhauser and Pound (1990) also found that the existence of dominant shareholdings increases the value of the firm because of the shareholders' more effective ability to monitor firm performance. In other words, larger shareholders have the propensity to act as monitors and thereby reduce agency costs 2. Familial Context. Definitions within this dimension focus on control of the business passing to younger members of the family over time and relying on a systems approach to identify family from non-family control. The former dimension was an essential part of the definitions of family business used by Churchill and Hatten (1987) and Ward (1987) , whereas the latter dimension was used by Beckard and Dyer (1983) and Davis (1983) to develop a deeper understanding of interactions and boundaries among the business system, the family system, founders of the business and the board of management. The systems approach also makes an attempt to determine the unique characteristics and relations between the family and business systems. Other definitions within this dimension propose that a diverse range of attributes are simultaneously required to define a family business, including ownership, involvement in day-to-day management of the business, generational transfers and links, family influence and family control.
Listed Family Firms.
A limited number of studies have provided definitions of family firms in the context of capital market research. Burch (1972) for instance, examined the top 300 manufacturing and 50 merchandising and other companies based on the 1965 Fortune 500 list, to determine the number of firms that were family controlled. He found that more than 47% of these publicly held firms were controlled by families. Burch's definition of family business falls within Handler's (1989) classification of 'multiple conditions'. He used the following criteria to define a family business; 1) between 4% to 5% or more of the voting stock must be held by a family or group of families or one (affluent) individual, and 2) family representation on the board over time.
Based on the 1992 Fortune 500 list, Jetha (1993) Along similar lines to Jetha (1993) , McConaughy (1994) found that 21% of publicly held companies on the Business Week 1000 list were family businesses. He defined a family business as one in which the CEO, President or Chairman is a descendant of the founding family. This definition is also consistent with Handler's (1989) generational transfer categorisation. investigated the relationship between founding family ownership and firm performance of the top 500 Standard and Poors (S&P) companies in the US between 1992 and 1999. They found that approximately 35% of the firms on the S&P 500 list were family controlled. The researchers used fractional equity ownership of the founding family and presence of family members on the board of directors to establish family and non-family control of these firms.
Following the above review of the literature encompassing family firms, a number of common themes were identified which form the basis of a definition of family business for the purposes of capital market research. These include:
• ownership of shares by an individual or related individuals, or by another entity in which an individual or related individual has/had an interest (directly or indirectly),
• control of a company by an individual or individuals, exercisable through various means including share ownership and board membership,
• concentration of ownership restricted to a relatively small group of individuals either directly or indirectly,
• continuity of control by an individual or group of related individuals, and
• dominance of decision making by an individual.
AGENCY THEORY AND THEORY OF THE FIRM
Many definitions rely on ownership and/or control as key attributes in determining the existence of a family business. Several of these definitions identify an alignment between ownership and control which family businesses enjoy (Gallo & Villaseca, 1998) , an important issue since the extent of ownership and/or control may be a critical factor in determining the success or otherwise of the business. Fama and Jensen (1983) and Ang, Cole and Lin (2000) have demonstrated the importance of family relationships in reducing agency costs and the influence of ownership and various control variables in the success of the firm. It would follow therefore, that some underlying theory regarding the ownership structure and the distribution of control in the firm should be examined in any study of family business. Accordingly, this paper provides a brief review of the agency theoretic perspective on family business, particularly the link between the alignment of ownership and control, and firm performance, as well as the importance of using a robust and generalisable definition of family business.
The theory of the firm provides, in part, some explanation of the capital/ownership structure of the firm, and the nexus between this structure and corporate governance mechanisms which are operationalised via the distribution of management control. Both Berle and Means (1932) and Coase (1937) focus specifically on the micro-economic (internal) attributes of firms, particularly the role of the entrepreneur, the relationship between key drivers within the firm (viz; managers, stockholders and debtholders) and their utility functions, and the contractual relationships and costs of the firm with suppliers and consumers of factors of production.
The work of Berle and Means (1932) and Coase (1937) has arguably been credited in the literature as the foundation for what is now known as 'agency theory'. Agency theory is generally concerned with the relationship between agents (managers) and principals (viz; shareholders and debtholders), the contracting process, and costs relevant to these parties.
There is an increasing popularity of using agency theory explanations for firm performance (Anderson, Mansi, & Reeb, 2003; McConaughy, 1994) . Agency theory posits that agency costs will be lower in firms that have a higher proportion/concentration of ownership and where the owners exercise greater control in the operations of the business compared to firms in reverse circumstances. Alchian and Demsetz (1972) , and more notably Jensen and Meckling (1976) are amongst the first wave of contributors to the development of agency theory in its current context. While Alchian and Demsetz (1972) focused on the important role of monitoring contracts in joint-input or team production, Jensen and Meckling (1976) emphasised the importance of monitoring all contracts (since the firm is essentially a nexus of contracts) and divided agency costs into specific and identifiable categories including monitoring costs, bonding costs, and residual losses. More importantly they demonstrated how agency costs increase as the level of ownership of the firm by the owner-manager decreases. In a subsequent paper, Jensen and Meckling (1979) also argue that ownership is a significant variable in the firm's production function and influences the performance of the firm. In their analysis of the various forms of business structures
(proprietorships, open corporations, professional partnerships, financial mutuals closed corporations and non-profit organizations), Fama and Jensen (1983) , hypothesised that agency costs are reduced in family relationships.
Given the significant role of agency theory in explaining firm performance, a robust operationalisation of family business is not only important for the advancement and further validation of agency theoretic perspectives, but will also obviate definitional problems of ownership and control in capital market research.
THEORETICAL DEVELOPMENT OF A DEFINITION OF FAMILY BUSINESS
Given the definitional diversity described above, this study focuses on those definitions and concepts that not only have commonality in the literature, but also more importantly, have the support of authoritative bodies. These include the various bodies representing the accounting profession and corporate regulators, such as CPA Australia, the Institute of Chartered Accountants in Australia, and the Australian Securities and Investments Commission. The rationale for this approach is that a definition of family business based on concepts and definitions that already have independent authoritative support, has the propensity to attract credibility and ultimately general acceptance amongst scholars and practitioners. In this respect, the definition of 'control', as embodied in Australian Accounting Standard AASB1024 -Consolidated Financial Statements (hereafter, AASB1024), has particular appeal in this study, since parallels can arguably be made between this definition and one of the more significant characteristics which delineates family firms from non-family firms, i.e., dominance of decision making by one individual. For instance, AASB1024 defines control as 'the capacity of an entity to dominate decision-making directly or indirectly, in relation to the financial and operating decision of another entity'. Moreover, the definition of 'entity' in the standard includes a 'person'. The link in all of this is that the capacity to dominate and indeed, the exercise of dominance by an individual in relation to operating and financing decisions, is recognised as a critical feature in family firms and, perhaps more importantly, is often required to ensure the survival of the family firm (e.g., Chua, 1999; McConaughy, 1994) .
The issue of dominance by an individual in family firms has also been given considerable support by accounting practitioners as indicated by the results of a survey of technical (accounting) specialists and practitioners undertaken as part of this study (see Appendix 1). Briefly, the results of the survey in Table 1 (which are discussed in more detail below) show that the importance of dominance in family firms was rated as highly significant by 96% of respondents, and almost all respondents rated 'ownership', 'control', and 'management structure' as highly appropriate attributes of family firms.
______________________

Insert Table 1 ______________________
There are also other potential reasons why the use of a 'control' criterion in defining a family firm has theoretical appeal. For example, several contributors to the family business literature have already identified 'control', particularly in respect to operating and financial decisions, as an important element in defining the family firm (Alcorn, 1982 , Lansberg et al., 1988 Dreux, 1990; Dönckels & Fröhlich, 1991; Gallo & Sveen 1991; Fiegener, Brown, Prince & File, 1994) . Moreover, there are parallels in the literature relating to the definition of family firms and the genesis of AASB1024 as an accounting standard. For example, comments by Lansberg et al, (1988) suggest that the difficulties in defining family firms (based on ownership) rests upon the various mechanisms used by families to keep the identities of shareholders hidden (p.3). This is a significant point and is arguably one of the main reasons which brought about the introduction of AASB1024 in Australia, i.e., the inability to determine the relationship between two entities (parent and subsidiary) based on an ownership test. Thus the definitions developed in AASB1024 which provide the framework for identifying controlling interests can also have application in a family firm context. Perhaps at this point, further coverage explaining the rationale for the introduction of AASB1024 and its relevance to this study is warranted.
In the context of Australian financial reporting requirements prior to 1986, the ownership of 50% of the ordinary shares in a company was used as the artificial cut-off point for determining whether a company qualified as a subsidiary. Thus if 50% or more of the ordinary shares of company were owned at balance date (that is, the date for preparing financial statements), the provisions of the Companies Code (now the Corporations Act) were invoked requiring the parent company (holder of the shares) to incorporate the results and the assets, liabilities and reserves of the subsidiary in its own financial statements. Briefly, this means that the parent entity has a legal obligation to fully reflect the financial statements of the subsidiary within its own financial statements. This process is generally referred to as a consolidation of the financial statements and is intended to provide useful financial information on a 'consolidated' basis to interested parties. These requirements seemed simple enough and the ownership test was evidently quite acceptable to the accounting fraternity for many years.
However, over the past two decades a number of sophisticated corporate vehicles have emerged against a background of complex taxation, corporate and other regulatory environments. Trusts and a variety of other interposed entities were commonly used for these purposes. These developments were exacerbated by an aversion for detailed financial disclosures and accordingly created some difficulties in using the ownership test for consolidation purposes. For instance, when a reporting entity in legal terms owns less than 50% of another entity, but in substance controls the affairs of that entity, should the reporting entity consolidate the financial statements of the controlled entity?
Alternatively, if the reporting entity owns greater than 50% of an entity, but in substance has no control whatsoever of the affairs of that entity, should it consolidate the financial affairs of an entity it has no control over?
The accounting profession addressed these difficulties by issuing Australian Accounting Standard AASB1024 -Consolidated Financial Statements, which requires controlled entities to be consolidated regardless of the level of ownership of these entities by the parent. Similar initiatives were pursued by the International Accounting Standards Committee (IASC) which issued IAS27 -Consolidated Financial Statements and Accounting for Investments in Subsidiaries, in 1990. While the issue of consolidating a subsidiary into the accounts of a holding entity is not the focus of this study, it does illustrate the difficulty in using ownership as a definitional criterion and provides parallels in developing a definition for the term "family business". Given the themes adopted above, there are persuasive arguments for using 'control' as one of the important criteria for defining a family firm.
Thus, in determining the existence of a family business, this study adopts in part, the control criterion promulgated by both, Australian Accounting Standard AASB1024, and International Accounting Standard IAS27, for consolidating an entity. This study also takes cognisance of the evidence in the literature which indicates that control and ownership of family businesses are non-diffuse and are typically characterised by an ownership structure in which shares are closely held by family members (Jensen & Meckling, 1976 ). Given the above discussion, a family business is defined as an entity controlled by a private individual, directly or indirectly, in conjunction with close family members. Moreover, control is broadly defined as the capacity to dominate decisionmaking. A detailed description of this definition of family business is provided below, together with a framework for operationalising various aspects of the definition for the purposes of capital market research.
METHOD
An archive-based case study method was selected to support the primary objective of determining whether family and non-family firms listed on the ASX can be delineated with the guidance of AASB 1024/IAS27 and their concomitant definitions of the terms 'control', 'closely held', and 'capacity to dominate decision-making'.
The data gathering and analysis procedure was divided into the following steps. First, an examination of financial statements and other corporate details using various databases was undertaken to determine whether it was possible to access and link information relating the themes of ownership, control, and continuity of control and dominance. Where company information or specific information relating to a company was not available from the ASX, a complementary database such as Bloomberg's was used to complement the initial data source. Annual financial statement files of the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) were also used to validate the initial data source, to examine related party disclosures, to examine continuity of control for a period of two years after the year ending 30 June 1998, and to validate the ASX data generally. Figure 1 outlines the procedures used in the initial stages of the study.
______________________
Insert Figure 1 ______________________
As the definition of family business proposed in the study was based on control by an individual (in conjunction with related parties) and continued control, relevant files of listed companies were examined, and information which provided evidence of the following factors was noted for each company; evidence of existing control, history of control, continuity of control (ASIC data), and related party relationships. Table 2 illustrates the specific criteria that were examined and used to differentiate family from non-family controlled firms. It noted also that, in addition to these criteria, only companies that exhibited the following characteristics were categorised within the family controlled group;
The existence of a dominant shareholder who is identified as a founding member involved in the management of the company and has a direct interest of greater than 20% of voting shares,
The dominant shareholder is the CEO or key member of the board (i.e.
Managing Director or Chairperson),
The dominant shareholder continues to be the dominant shareholder and member of the board during the observation period, i.e. 1 year prior to the IPO listing and three years subsequent to the IPO listing At least one other related party is a member of the board
The dominant shareholder, in conjunction with other related parties, holds greater than 40% of the voting shares in the company directly or indirectly, after the IPO listing
The initial differentiation analysis revealed that out of the 1,214 active companies on the ASX at 30 June 1998, 197 (16.23%) were family controlled and 1,017 (83.77%) were non-family controlled. However, details of companies not falling directly within the dichotomous groups required a further comprehensive analysis for evidence of ownership, control and dominance. This was undertaken for approximately 60 companies using detailed ASIC data including relevant statutory lodgements where relevant (e.g. Form 316, which requires companies to annually disclose ownership interests).
______________________ Insert Table 2 ______________________
This process provided a validation of the procedures required to delineate family and non-family controlled businesses, and confirmed the information relating to company ownership, control and dominance was in fact accessible. That is, if not initially during the first level of searching (via a variety of databases), then almost always after second, third, fourth, etc., level searches using the ASIC database. The validation procedure allowed links to be established between directors, their related interests and their director-related entities. Figure 2 illustrates a typical example of searches. The example (using fictitious names), illustrates the extent to which some companies required downstream ownership searches to determine whether or not they qualified as family businesses. Indeed in some cases, 9 th and even 10 th level searches were required. This was made possible by having access to the ASIC database which allowed searches of not only public company holdings but more importantly, private company holdings. In this respect the current study was unique given that the authors had access to data which was not publicly available and were thus able to make significant links between directors and their director related entities.
______________________ Insert Figure 2 ______________________
The example in Figure 2 provides sufficient evidence of ownership and control to suggest that ABC Ltd is a family business. For instance, both John and Mary Citizen (who are assumed to be related) jointly hold 25% of the voting shares in ABC Ltd directly. They also hold at least 25% of the shares in ABC Ltd indirectly through the joint ownership of interposed entities; Citizen Pty Ltd and J Nominees Pty Ltd (a trustee company acting on behalf of the Citizen Family Trust).
John and Mary Citizen were cited in the ASX datadiscs as being the founders of the company and both have been directors since its formation some 10 years earlier.
Moreover John Citizen has been the executive director during that time, and both John and Mary Citizen had attended all directors meetings in the past year. Interestingly in this case, Brian Citizen, also a director of ABC Ltd, has a small holding of shares (4%) within the diverse holdings percentage. It may be assumed that Brian Citizen is also a family member.
In order to provide independent verification and validation of the criteria used in determining the definition of family business, a questionnaire was developed and distributed to all members of the Emerging Accounting and Auditing Issues Group (EAAIG), a group comprising technical directors of the major Chartered Accounting firms, and financial and technical specialists from industry and regulatory bodies. The standardised instrument comprised four short questions covering the fundamental attributes of family business viz; control, ownership and dominance (see Appendix 1).
The intent was to solicit the views of technical specialists who would have in-depth knowledge and experience to comment on a wide variety of issues relating to businesses in general. Table 1 .
Results indicate that overwhelmingly (96%) members in the group support the notions of 'dominance' (by one or more individuals) as being a highly significant factor in family business. Moreover, 100% of respondents indicated that 'ownership' and 'control' were important, whereas 93% stated that 'management structure' was an important attribute.
Following these procedures, it was established that of the 1,214 active companies listed on the ASX as at 30 June 1998, 211 (17.1%) were family controlled and 1,012 (82.9%) were non-family controlled companies.
OPERATIONAL DEFINITION OF FAMILY BUSINESS
Given the above theoretical framework and survey results, a family business is defined as an entity controlled by a private individual in conjunction with close family members with continuity of control evident. It is important to note that, the terms 'control' and 'close family members' are both critical components in operationalising the definition of family business. Control is defined as the capacity of an entity to dominate decisionmaking, directly or indirectly, in relation to the financial and operating policies of another entity so as to enable that other entity to operate with it in pursuing the objective of the controlling entity (AASB1024). Moreover, control is defined as the power to govern the financial and operating policies of an enterprise (IAS27). Further, there are several indicators which could potentially support the existence of control of an entity, including; the holding of a majority ownership interest and associated voting rights either singularly or in conjunction with close family members, the capacity to dominate the composition of the board of directors or governing body of another entity, the capacity to appoint or remove all or a majority of the directors or governing members of another entity; and the capacity to control the casting of the majority of the votes cast at a meeting of the board of directors or governing board of another entity (AASB1024, 7[xvi(a) to (e)]). Finally continuity of control is a significant factor in defining a family firm. Thus the presence of control by individuals, using the indicators above, was examined over several periods subsequent to the initial delineation date in 1998. This outcome adds a new dimension to the family business, accounting and finance literatures and has the potential to contribute significantly to future research in these fields. For instance, it may assist in addressing the urgent need for definitional consensus (Wortman, 1994; Shanker & Astrachan, 1996) by providing the foundation from which a generally accepted definition of family business can be developed. This outcome may in turn provide valuable information which could assist in validating statistics (Shanker & Astrachan, 1996) and other data in existing or future studies which draw comparisons between family and non-family businesses.
However, perhaps one of the more significant contributions of this paper is the ability to delineate family from non-family businesses for the purposes of capital market research.
Recent studies (e.g., have shown that family businesses are emerging as significant contributors not only to Gross Domestic Product but also to capital markets generally. It is evident from the literature that ownership and control are significant variables that influence managerial incentives and thus impact on firm performance. Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Fama and Jensen (1983) have posited that the dynamics underlying family relationships reduce agency costs and improve efficiency. Extant research (e.g., Morck, Scleifer & Vishny 1988; Wruck 1989; McConnell & Servaes 1990; McConaughy, 1994; Ang et al., 2000; has also found an association between concentrated ownership and control, and firm performance. Given these findings and the evidence that family businesses are typically characterized by higher levels of ownership and control, studies which examine the performance of listed enterprises would expect to find differences in the performance levels of family firms compared to non-family firms ceteris paribus. In this regard, the ability to accurately differentiate between family and non-family businesses is of importance in further advancing knowledge in this area.
One example of the potential usefulness of an operational definition of family business in capital market studies is the examination and delineation of IPO firms to determine the significance of ownership and control on both underpricing and performance. A study of this nature, which delineates family and non-family enterprises in a widely acceptable manner, would be useful in understanding the phenomena, particularly if it can be established that the level of underpricing is different between family and nonfamily groupings. It would also be useful to establish whether factors known to influence the level of underpricing are mediated by association with the dichotomous groupings; family and non-family.
Overall, the main strength of this research is the rigorous process by which family and non-family controlled firms have been delineated and validated. The researchers had access to detailed restricted ASIC data which included relevant statutory lodgements such as Form 316 requiring companies to annually disclose ownership interests, documents related to initial subscriber and substantial interests, correspondence to ASIC from company directors, prospectus documents, and other relevant background information. Over a two year period, the researchers were able to gather enough evidence from the corporate regulator to validate the delineation of family and nonfamily controlled firms by establishing the nature of control for the overwhelming majority of companies listed on the ASX in 1998 1 ; by ascertaining the history of each firm's control; by determining the continuity of each firm's control, and; by establishing the firm's related party relationships. Thus through this process the researchers were able to establish important links between directors and their private related entities. 
FIGURE 2
Notes:
1. Citizen Pty Ltd is effectively controlled by John and Mary Citizen, who won 40% of the company directly and the balance indirectly via equal ownership of XYZ Pty Ltd.
2. J Nominees Pty Ltd is the trustee company of the Citizen Family Trust which is owned jointly by John and Mary Citizen. Note that all distributions made by the trust are the responsibility of the trustee, that is J Nominee Pty Ltd which is owned by John and Mary Citizen. 
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